Given Kosovo’s unresolved international status, EULEX did not have an easy start. Only the EU’s long-term commitment to stabilise the Western Balkans, and extensive preparations since 2006 ensured that a compromise on a ‘status neutral’ EU mission under the political umbrella of the UN could be reached. EULEX should sidestep the political debates over independence and focus on monitoring, mentoring and advising Kosovo’s police, customs and judicial authorities. Strengthening the Rule of Law was considered integral to Kosovo’s long-term prospects for European integration.

There was grounds for optimism. The Head of Mission, Yves de Kermabon, enjoyed local respect as a former KFOR commander, while operational management was in the hands of very experienced officials that had participated in numerous international missions in the Western Balkans. Driven by the desire to do better than previous UNMIK mission, EULEX soon published a comprehensive analysis of Kosovo’s Security Sector and set out clear and ambitious benchmarks for reform (the so-called ‘programmatic approach’). The mission also took care to build political momentum for reform through the so-called Rule of Law Coordination Board that includes all critical Kosovar authorities. Last but not least, EULEX itself could draw on unprecedented number of staff and financial resources to promote its objectives all across the country.

One year later some progress can be made out. Police and judges in the Serbian-dominated Northern part of Kosovo have resumed their work, and various reforms in Kosovo’s dysfunctional court system have been initiated. EULEX also made some steps to re-establish customs controls (an important component of Kosovo’s budget) and continued to support the Kosovo Police Service in its process of modernisation, for instance, by boosting its investigative capacities for corruption and financial crimes. The mission clearly operates on the assumption that this is just the beginning. Although EULEX’ current mandate has to be renewed in summer 2010, it sticks to its very wide-ranging reform programme. Rebuilding faith in the justice system is an especially difficult and long-term endeavour.

However, EULEX also inherited various ‘executive’ tasks from the previous UN mission, namely to prosecute serious crimes and to exercise oversight powers in the Serbian North. This has led to serious frictions with the status-neutral image of EULEX and may endanger its staying power. Wide-spread protests broke out in August, when it was revealed that EULEX intended to sign ‘technical protocols’ with Serbia on police and customs cooperation. Activists argued that this constituted a violation of national sovereignty, as these protocols underlined the problematic status of the North and had been negotiated in secret. So EULEX could be presented as a continuation of UNMIK, which the majority of Kosovars had come to regard as illegitimate, ineffective, and unaccountable.

Backed by Javier Solana EULEX held its ground and signed the protocols. Yves de Kermabon went on a public relations campaign and promised to create a Human Rights Review Panel that citizens could appeal to if they felt mistreated by EULEX staff. However, a similar mechanism instituted by UNMIK had failed to change the negative public perception of ‘internationals’ in Kosovo.

So it is not surprising that EULEX could not avoid being tainted by Kosovo’s latest political crisis. A former secret police officer claimed to have assassinated several opposition politicians at behest of leading figures of Kosovo’s governing party, the LDK. The opposition politician that publicised the incriminating tape claims that EULEX knew of the case for or more than a month, but chose to keep it secret ahead of Kosovo’s recent local elections. Various commentators have followed suit and accused EULEX of prioritising appearances of stability over the pursuit of justice.

There are even more fundamental challenges to the EU’s engagement in Kosovo. Citizens were severely disappointed at the end of November, when the European Commission extended visa-free travel to Serbia, but not to Kosovo. The unblocking of an EU-Serbian Trade agreement this week accentuated the perception of Kosovars that their country is persistently falling behind. High unemployment and a lack of investment remain the most pressing problem and fuel many of the criminal activities that EULEX seeks to combat.

Last but not least, the case on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence has just entered a decisive period before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. This Tuesday Serbia presented its objections and hearings will conclude at the end of this week. Serbia will not abandon its opposition to Kosovo’s independence, no matter what the Court decides. But a negative ruling would bury hopes that all EU member states could recognise Kosovo in the foreseeable future.

In short, Kosovo’s progress towards a European future cannot be taken for granted. Yet Brussels seems dangerously detached. The outgoing Swedish Presidency unsuccessfully focused on resolving the constitutional crisis in Bosnia, whereas the incoming Spanish Presidency has not even recognised Kosovo. And while Baroness Ashton fights an uphill struggle to establish her credibility, officials are mostly concerned with the impending creation of the External Action Service.

So far European managed to promote technical reforms in Kosovo. But EULEX cannot play on time any longer, as there is a growing sense of political instability and frustration about the lack of economic development. The following Spanish Presidency should not be allowed to treat questions over the future of Kosovo with benign neglect.